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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §§ 63~46b-116 and 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
(1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing properly revoked Petitioner's licenses to practice as a 
dentist and to administer and prescribe controlled substances in 
the state of Utah pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16 (1953, as amended). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
In addition to the jurisdictional statutes referenced 
elsewhere in this brief, this case is governed by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 58-
1-1 et seq., by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq., and by the Rules of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Utah Administrative 
Code, Rule R153-1-1 et seq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner has filed a Petition for Review of certain 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Recommended Order and an 
Order of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah (the 
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"Division") revoking Petitioner's licenses to practice as a 
Dentist and to administer and prescribe controlled substances in 
the State of Utah, together with the Division's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law contained in its Order on Review, The 
administrative action against Petitioner's licenses was filed 
with the Division on or about August 24, 1988, and the matter 
came on for administrative hearing on June 7, 1989, before the 
Dentists and Dental Hygienists Board (hereinafter "Board") with 
the Honorable J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, 
presiding. On or about June 22, 1989, the Division issued an 
Order adopting the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommended Order submitted by the Dental Board. The Order 
revoked Petitioner's licenses to practice as a Dentist and to 
prescribe and administer controlled substances in the State of 
Utah. On or about July 3, 1989, Petitioner filed a Request for 
Agency Review with the Division. On or about July 26, 1989, oral 
argument on Petitioner's Request for Agency Review was conducted. 
On September 12, 1989, an Order on Review was issued by David E. 
Robinson, Director of the Division, affirming the June 22, 1989 
Order revoking Petitioner's licenses. On or about October 20, 
1989, Petitioner and the Division entered into a Stipulation to 
Conditional Stay of Revocation Pending Judicial Review, which 
stayed revocation of Petitioner's licenses pending review by this 
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Court, subject to certain terms and conditions. Petitioner 
subsequently filed this Petition for Judicial Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner is, and at all times relevant to these 
proceedings has been, licensed to practice dentistry and to 
administer and prescribe controlled substances in the state of 
Utah. (Tr. at 146; R.21 at pg. 2 para. 1; Br. at 5.)1 
2. On several occasions between 1983 through 1987, 
Petitioner molested his twin daughters, who, at the time the 
molestations began, were 12 years of age. The molestations took 
place in Petitioner's home until approximately 1985 and included 
disrobing of clothing, fondling of the girls' breasts, and 
manipulation of their pubic regions. On several occasions 
between 1985 through 1987, Petitioner molested the girls in the 
just-described manner at his office after he had performed dental 
procedures and during such time as the girls were under the 
influence of nitrous oxide and other drugs. (Br. at 5; R.21 at 
pg. 2, para. 2; Tr. at 148-91; R.12 at pg. 1, para, la.) 
*For purposes of this Brief, Petitioner's Brief will be 
abbreviated as "Br. at "; the transcript of the hearing 
contained in the record will be abbreviated as "Tr. at "; and 
the documentary evidence in the record shall be referred to as 
"R. at M, pursuant to the numbers assigned by the Division 
when those documents were forwarded to this Court. 
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3. On or about March, 1988, criminal charges were 
initiated against Petitioner on the basis of the above-described 
conduct. On May 17, 1988, in the District Court for the Second 
Judicial District, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of 
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony. Petitioner 
submitted an Affidavit to the District Court admitting that 
between 1986 and February 1987, he did touch the breasts, 
buttocks, or genitalia of the girls, or did otherwise take 
indecent liberties with them with the intent to arouse or gratify 
his sexual desires, and without their consent. (Br. at 5? R.12 
at pg. 2, para. b.) 
4. On or about August 29, 1988, the Division 
initiated action against Petitioner's licenses to practice as a 
Dentist and to prescribe and administer controlled substances by 
filing a Petition alleging that Petitioner violated various 
provisions of the Dentists and Dental Hygienists Act and the 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§58-7-1 and 58-1-1, et seq., with relation to the sexual abuse 
referenced above. (R.l; Br. at 6.) 
5. On or about April 5, 1989, the Dental Board, by 
and through its members, submitted a Memorandum to David E. 
Robinson, Director of the Division, requesting that immediate 
action be taken against Petitioner's license to practice 
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dentistry based upon numerous complaints from the public and the 
fact that Petitioner had been convicted of a felony charge of 
sexual abuse. This action by the Board was prompted by the fact 
that the Board felt that Petitioner represented a threat to the 
safety and welfare of the public. (R.16.) 
6. The Memorandum referenced in the previous 
paragraph was apparently initiated by Dr. Reinerth, a member of 
the Dental Board, after Dr. Reinerth received 26 telephone calls 
from members of the public regarding Petitioner. (Tr. at 11-13.) 
7. Given the existence of the April 5, 1989, 
Memorandum from the Dental Board to David E. Robinson, Judge 
Eklund, the Administrative Law Judge and Presiding Officer at 
hearing, questioned all members of the Dental Board regarding 
their impartiality at the initiation of the hearing, held on June 
7, 1989. Each member of the Board indicated the ability to 
discharge his or her responsibilities without prejudice, and upon 
the basis of the evidence to be presented. Additionally, 
Petitioner's counsel was allowed to voir dire each member of the 
Board. During this questioning it was determined that, aside 
from Dr. Reinerth, the only information that any of the Board 
members had regarding Petitioner was that two of the remaining 
five Board members had read a newspaper article regarding the 
case. At Petitioner's counsel's request, Dr. Reinerth was 
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recused from the hearing, and Petitioner's counsel stated that he 
had "no problem" with the other Board members, (Tr. at 3-14; 
R.27 at 3-5.) 
8. On June 7, 1989, the matter came on for heciring 
before the Dental Board, and a Stipulation of Facts signed by-
Sheila Page, Assistant Attorney General, and counsel for 
Petitioner was received into evidence* (Tr. at 3; R.12.) 
9. After taking the matter under advisement, the 
Board issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a 
Recommended Order that Petitioner's licenses to practice 
dentistry and to administer and prescribe controlled substances 
in the State of Utah be revoked. On June 22, 1989, David E. 
Robinson, Director of the Division, adopted the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order issued by the Dental 
Board on behalf of the Division. (R.21.) 
10. On or about July 3, 1989f Petitioner filed a 
Request for Agency Review with the Division, in which Petitioner 
asserted substantially the same arguments as are asserted in his 
brief before this Court. (R.22.) 
11. After oral argument on Petitioner's Request for 
Agency Review was conducted on July 26, 1989, before J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, and David E. Robinson, Director 
of the Division, the Division issued an Order on Review, signed 
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by David E. Robinson, with detailed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, which Order affirmed the Division's Order 
dated June 22, 1989, revoking Petitioner's licenses to practice 
as a Dentist and to administer and prescribe controlled 
substances. (R.27.) 
12. On or about October 6, 1989, Petitioner filed a 
Petition for Review with this Court, seeking review of the Orders 
issued by the Division in this case. (R. 28.) 
13. On or about October 20, 1989, the Division and 
Petitioner entered into a Stipulation to Conditional Stay of 
Revocation Pending Judicial Review, which allowed Petitioner to 
continue to practice dentistry and to prescribe and administer 
controlled substances on a restricted basis pending a decision by 
this Court on appeal. (R.30.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In his brief Petitioner argues five points: 
1. That the Dental Board reached "an implied finding 
of fact and conclusion of law which was not supported by 
substantial evidence." (Br. at 9-12.) 
2. That the Division erred in not granting Petitioner 
relief from the Board's actions where it concluded that the 
record did not support the Board's conclusions of law. (Br. at 
12. ) 
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3. That members of the Dental Board were biased, not 
impartial, and should have disqualified themselves at hearing, 
(Br, at 12-18, ) 
4. That the Board failed to make sufficient findings 
of fact upon which to base its conclusions of law, and that 
therefore the Board's decision to revoke rather than suspend 
Petitioner's licenses was arbitrary and capricious, (Br. at 18-
19,) 
5. That the Board's revocation of Petitioner's 
licenses was contrary to the Division's prior practices in 
similar matters, and was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious. 
(Br. at 19-20.) 
Each of Petitioner's arguments is without merit in 
light of the record taken as a whole. Each of the Dental Board's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is supported by 
substantial evidence (indeed overwhelming evidence) when viewed 
in light of the entire record. The Division did not err in 
refusing to grant Petitioner relief from the Division's Order 
adopting the Board's Recommended Order revoking Petitioner's 
licenses where Petitioner's actions, admitted to by stipulation 
and testified to repeatedly in the hearing itself, established 
gross unprofessional conduct on Petitioner's part, which 
Petitioner's own counsel agreed was "heinous" and "more than 
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sufficient for [the Board] to suspend and revoke his license." 
(Tr. at 294- ) 
Both Petitioner and the Administrative Law Judge voir 
dired each member of the Dental Board, and after recusing one 
member, Petitioner accepted the other members of the Dental 
Board, each having testified to his or her impartiality and 
ability to act fairly and properly in discharging his or her 
responsibilities as Board member in the hearing. Petitioner's 
argument that the Board was biased and not impartial is, 
therefore, unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. 
The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
detailed, well reasoned, and completely supported by substantial 
evidence. Those findings and conclusions amply support (indeed 
mandate) the Board's recommendation and the Division's decision 
to revoke Petitioner's licenses, and such decision is in no way 
arbitrary and capricious. 
Finally, Petitioner has cited no authority or example 
to support his argument that the Division's decision to revoke 
his licenses was contrary to prior practices and/or that such 
decision was arbitrary and capricious. In fact, the decision to 
revoke Petitioner's licenses was in complete harmony with prior 
practices of the Division, and as counsel for Petitioner has 
admitted, was fully justified by Petitioner's conduct. 
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ARGUMENT 
I- STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1953, as amended) of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act governs judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings of administrative agencies in 
this State, That section provides in relevant part as follows: 
The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court[.] 
Commenting upon this "substantial evidence" test, this 
Court stated, in Grace Drilling Co, v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
63 (Utah App. 1989), as follows: 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 
'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 
'something less than the weight of the 
evidence.'" (Quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund 
v, Hunicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 
(1985) and Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 
(1966)). "Substantial evidence is 'such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" 
Id. 
In applying the "substantial evidence test," 
we review the ''whole record" before the 
court, and this review is distinguishable 
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"from both a de novo review and the 'any 
competent evidence' standard of review." 
It is also important to note that the "whole 
record test" necessarily requires that a 
party challenging the Board's Findings of 
Fact must marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. (Citations omitted) 
In undertaking such a review, this court will 
not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though we 
may have come to a different conclusion had 
the case come before us for de novo review, 
(Citations omitted). It is the province of 
the Board, not the appellate courts, to 
resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw 
the inferences, (Citation omitted) 
Id, at 68 (Footnotes omitted). 
In reviewing mixed questions of law and fact this Court 
applies an intermediate standard of "reasonableness and 
rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P. 2d 
439 (Utah App. 1989). Under this standard, a court "will not 
disturb the Board's application of its factual findings to the 
law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality." J[d. at 442. 
Finally, its reviewing pure interpretations of law, the 
courts will apply a "correction-of-error" standard, which this 
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Court has stated means that the agency's interpretations of 
statute will be supported if not erroneous. See Bevans v. 
Industrial Commission, 790 P,2d 573, 576 (Utah App, 1990). 
In the present case, Petitioner has attacked certain of 
the Board's Findings of Fact, and has also attacked the 
Division's application of facts to the applicable rules and 
statutes, namely, the determination that Petitioner's 
unprofessional conduct should result in revocation of his 
licenses. The former argument is governed by the "substantial 
evidence" test, and the latter is governed by the standard of 
"reasonableness and rationality," Additionally, Petitioner has 
challenged the Board's impartiality, the sufficiency of the 
Board's Findings of Fact, and has alleged that the Division's 
revocation of Petitioner's licenses was contrary to the 
Division's prior practices. Each of these arguments will be 
addressed below, 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW CONTAINED IN THE DIVISION'S ORDER AND 
ORDER ON REVIEW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
In the Conclusions of Law issued by the Dental Board, 
adopted by the Division, and later modified slightly on agency 
review, the Board found that Petitioner committed unprofessional 
conduct compelling the conclusion that Petitioner's licenses 
should be revoked. (R.21 at 4-6.) Petitioner argues that but 
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for certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which, 
Petitioner asserts, are not supported by substantial evidence, 
the Board "would normally have placed the Petitioner-Appellant on 
some sort of probationary status, which was what the Petitioner-
Appellant had urged the Board to do throughout the proceeding." 
(Br. at 10.) Petitioner cites no precedent or rationale for this 
bald assumption. Petitioner then quotes portions of the 
following Conclusions of Law reached by the Board: 
However, the nature of Respondent's misdeeds 
was significantly altered when he 
subsequently utilized his licensure to 
facilitate his continued criminal conduct. 
The combination of nitrous oxide and chloral 
hydrate, which Respondent administered to the 
two girls, would have produced a level of 
anesthesia much greater than that necessary 
to merely allay whatever apprehensions they 
may have had as patients during the dental 
procedures which Respondent performed. 
Further, the excessive amounts of chloral 
hydrate, which Respondent administered, 
created a serious risk of injury or death to 
both patients. In so doing, Respondent 
failed to consistently act in the best 
interest of his two patients, and thus, 
violated the fundamental ethic of any health 
care professional. Given Respondent's prior 
sexual misconduct involving the two girls, it 
is clearly obvious that he willfully 
maltreated them in order to satisfy his own 
desires. 
The lengthy duration of Respondent's 
reprehensible misconduct reflects a serious 
problem. Further, the use of his 
professional standing and access to 
medication to perpetrate his misconduct 
mandates that a severe sanction be entered in 
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this case. Notwithstanding the psychological 
evaluation which was conducted and 
Respondent's assertion that his dental 
practice should be allowed to continue, 
Respondents egregious misuse of his license 
compels the conclusion that said license 
should longer be available to him. 
(R.21 at 5-6.) 
Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, with one minor 
exception which was corrected on agency review, each of the 
Board's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
including those referenced above, is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
In its Order on Review (R.27 at 6-8) the Division, 
under the signature of David E. Robinson, its Director, sets 
forth a detailed summary of the evidence presented at the 
administrative hearing regarding Petitioner's unprofessional 
conduct. This summary contains specific citations to the record, 
and sets forth the evidence supporting the Findings of Fact 
referenced above. The Division's summary of the evidence was 
prepared in reference to the same argument which Petitioner is 
now making on appeal. For the sake of brevity, the Division 
adopts the summary of evidence contained in the Order on Review 
and will not reproduce it in this Brief. It is clear from the 
record, including the Stipulation of Facts (R.12), that all of 
the Findings of Fact ultimately entered by the Division, and the 
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Conclusions of Law based thereon, are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
In the Order on Review the Division modified one 
statement made in the Board's Conclusions of Law. That statement 
was: "Further, the excessive amount of chloral hydrate, which 
Respondent administered, created a serious risk of injury or 
death to both patients•" (R.27 at 8.) The Order on Review 
states: 
The record does not support a finding that 
Respondent administered an excessive amount 
of chloral hydrate as to have created any 
serious risk of injury or death to either 
patient and there is no sufficient evidence 
to find that his conduct created a life-
threatening situation for his daughters. 
Nevertheless, Respondent's calculated use of 
the medications in question for a completely 
inappropriate purposey clearly sustains the 
Board's conclusion that Respondent failed to 
consistently act in the best interest of his 
two patients and that he thus violated the 
fundamental ethic of any health care 
professional. Simply put, the record 
sustains those Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which were otherwise 
entered by the Board. 
(R.27 at 8-9; emphasis added.) 
While the Division found that the Board had incorrectly 
concluded that Petitioner's conduct created a serious risk of 
death to his daughters, Division Director David E. Robinson, who 
was present at the hearing and participated therein, concluded on 
review that despite this error, which he corrected, "the record 
15 
sustained the other Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered by the Board," (R,21 at 9•) Petitioner has failed to 
"marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show 
that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co.r 776 P.2d at 68. 
Petitioner's argument that the Board's Findings of Fact are not 
supported by the record is, therefore, without merit. 
III. THE DIVISION DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING 
PETITIONER RELIEF ON REVIEW. 
Petitioner argues that the Administrative Law Judge, 
whom, Petitioner erroneously asserts, entered the Order on 
Review, erred in that he failed to grant Petitioner relief on 
review. In fact, David E. Robinson, Director of the Division, 
entered the Order of Review, not the Administrative Law Judge. 
(R.27 at 14. David E. Robinson, for and on behalf of the 
Division, has authority to enter orders in administrative cases 
brought before the Division pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-1-4 
and 58-1-16. Additionally, the Director, not the Administrative 
Law Judge, has the authority to, and in this case did, enter an 
appropriate Order on Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
12(1) and Rule R151-46b-12 of the Utah Administrative Cede. 
Petitioner's argument that the Administrative Law Judge erred in 
not granting Petitioner relief is, therefore, without merit, and 
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the Division Director, who is charged with entering final orders 
both after hearing and on review, appropriately made changes to 
the Board's Findings of Fact, and concluded, as did the Board, 
that Petitioner's actions required revocation of his licenses. 
Petitioner has failed to establish any reason why the Division's 
actions constituted error, nor has he explained why the Director, 
who has ultimate authority to enter final orders, did so 
improperly, 
IV. THE BOARD MEMBERS FULFILLED THEIR DUTY 
IN A RESPONSIBLE AND UNBIASED MANNER, 
Petitioner argues that the Board members who heard this 
case were biased and not impartial and should have disqualified 
themselves. (Br, at 12-18,) The argument is unsupported by the 
record. Each Board member acted in a responsible and forthright 
manner, and the decision to revoke Petitioner's licenses should 
be upheld. Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, the record in 
this case shows that the Board acted in a professional and 
unbiased manner. Before hearing the facts, the Administrative 
Law Judge, at counsels' request, polled each Board member to 
ensure Petitioner a fair hearing. One Board member was recused 
at Petitioner's counsel's request after stating she had received 
phone calls from individuals regarding the case. After careful 
examination, free from further objection, the Judge determined 
that the remaining Board members were able to act in a fair and 
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impartial manner, and Petitioner's counsel indicated acceptance 
of the Board- (Br. at 13-14.) 
Petitioner has failed to show that the Board members 
were biased, choosing rather to characterize their efforts to 
become fully informed by asking questions of witnesses as somehow-
inappropriate. Petitioner accuses the Board of trying to impeach 
witnesses, of displaying preconceived opinions, and of testifying 
when they were unqualified. (Br. at 14-17.) A review of the 
record reveals that these claims are unfounded. What are 
characterized as improprieties were in fact diligent efforts by 
Board members to explore the relevant issues and to afford 
Petitioner a fair hearing. Not only was this the right of each 
Board member, it was their duty. There is no support for any 
claim that the members of the Board acted inappropriately toward 
any of the witnesses, nor that they showed anything but a 
diligent effort to get at the truth. 
In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), the Wisconsin 
Medical Examining Board brought an action to suspend the license 
of a practicing physician over the physician's objection that the 
Board was biased because the Board had conducted the preliminary 
investigation. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that members of the 
State Board were not precluded from holding an adversary hearing 
on the matter even though the charges evolved from the Bocird's 
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own investigation. The Court explained the heavy burden 
associated with proving bias in an administrative adjudication. 
The Court stated, "[Showing] bias in administrative adjudication 
has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry- It must 
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving 
as adjudicators." JEd,. at 47. In the instant case Petitioner has 
failed to overcome this presumption of honesty and integrity of 
the Board members. 
In addition to Petitioner's failure to demonstrate 
bias, Petitioner waived the right to appeal this issue by failing 
to object to the presence of particular Board members during the 
hearing. If the issue of bias is to be preserved for appeal, 
objection must be made at the time of the hearing. Petitioner 
failed to object to individual Board members with the exception 
of Ms. Reinerth who was recused. (Br. at 13-14.) In City of 
Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 186 111. App. 3d 303, 134 111. 
Dec. 244, 542 N.E.2d 423 (1989), Rockford City claimed that the 
County Board's denial, after hearing, of the City's application 
for approval of a landfill site was biased and fundamentally 
unfair due to Board member's having received ex parte contacts 
from concerned individuals. Several members of the Board were 
recused, and the decision was made by nondisqualified Board 
members. Id. at 430. The court stated that the Petitioner had 
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waived its claim of bias or prejudice because the claim "must be 
asserted promptly after knowing of the alleged disqualification, 
since it would be improper to allow a party to withhold a claim 
of bias until it obtains an unfavorable ruling." JEd. at 431. 
Likewisef in the instant case, each Board member was questioned, 
with one member being recused. No objection was lodged as to any 
of the remaining Board members, and the record indicates that 
none of them had any ex parte contact which would have required 
recusal. Using the language of Rockford, it would be "improper 
to allow [Petitioner] to withhold a claim of bias until [he] 
obtains an unfavorable ruling." JEd. at 431. Therefore, 
Petitioner has waived his right to claim bias, and the decision 
of the Board and the Division should be upheld. 
V. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ENTERED BY THE DIVISION IN THIS CASE ARE 
CLEAR, ACCURATE, AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
Petitioner argues, without providing any support 
whatsoever, that "the Board failed to find Findings of Fact which 
support their Conclusions of Law and recommendation in this 
matter." (Br.18.) A cursory review of the Board's Findings of 
Fact (R.21), as well as those entered by the Division in its 
Order on Review (R.27), reveals that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law based thereon are accurate, concise, and 
supported by substantial evidence. The Board and the Division 
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both entered findings sufficient to support the conclusions of 
law reached on all material issues. Petitioner has provided no 
example or reason why the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
do not meet the standard annunciated in Milne Truck Lines v. 
Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373 (Utah 1986) and his 
argument is without merit. 
VI. THE DIVISION'S ORDER REVOKING 
PETITIONER'S LICENSES IS IN HARMONY WITH 
PRIOR PRACTICE IN SIMILAR MATTERS. 
Petitioner argues that the Division's decision to 
revoke his licenses rather than place him on probation was 
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the Division's pirior 
practice. (Br. at 19-20.) Petitioner's citations to the record 
do not support this argument, nor does he provide and basis for 
his claim that the decision is arbitrary. As with Petitioner's 
other arguments, this issue was addressed fully by the Division 
in its Order on Review. (R.27 at 9-11.) Without reproducing the 
entire explanation, briefly, since 1987, two (2) orders have been 
issued by the Division involving dentists who engaged in sexual 
misconduct. In one case, a dentist who engaged in sexual 
misconduct with his nine-year old son had his licenses placed on 
probation where there "was no evidence that the just-described 
misconduct occurred relative to any dentist-patient relationship 
. . ." (R.27 at pg. 10, para. 5.) In the second case, a dentist 
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who engaged in sexual misconduct with five female patients over a 
three-year period of time had his licenses revoked. The sexual 
misconduct "occurred while [the dentist] was performing dental 
services, and during such time when the patients were under the 
influence of nitrous oxide." (R.27 at pg, 9, para. 2.) As David 
E. Robinson pointed out in his Conclusions of Law relative to 
this argument, Petitioner's sexual misconduct with his daughters, 
perpetrated in his dental office while the girls were under the 
effects of nitrous oxide, more closely resembles the misconduct 
of the dentist whose license was revoked than that of the dentist 
whose license was placed on probation, due to the fact that in 
the former case the sexual misconduct was perpetrated and 
facilitated through the use the dentist's licensure and access to 
controlled substances. 
Petition has failed in his attempt to .explain why the 
Division's revocation of his licenses was contrary to prior 
practices, and has offered no evidence to support his conclusion 
that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, the 
decision to revoke Petitioner's licenses does not exceed the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality, and thus, under the 
standard pronounced in Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review,, 
775 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1989), this Court should not disturb the 
Board's application of its factual findings to the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
In his conclusion Petitioner argues that, "It would be 
reasonable to suspend Petitioner-Appellant's licenses and place 
the Petitioner-Appellant on probation for a reasonable period of 
time with safe guards (sic) to protect his patients and himself 
from false allegations." (Br. at 21-22.) Petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate why this Court should modify the Board's decision 
under the applicable standards of review, nor has he explciined 
why the decision and the underlying Findings of Fact and. 
Conclusions of Law should be disturbed. In sum, Petitioner's 
arguments are unsupported, and he has failed to meet his burden 
of establishing grounds for disturbing the Division's Orders 
revoking his licenses. 
Respectfully submitted this .^6? day of ^ptfyrthzC , 
1990 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General of Utah 
// 
DAVID W.^LUtyD y I 
Assistant At£orjiey General 
Tax and Business Regulation Div. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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